This post
is rooted in the conviction that ‘politics stop at the water’s edge.’
It was a
mistake to make the physical invasion of Iraq as we did. There were strong
humanitarian reasons for doing so; Saddam Hussein was a barbarous dictator. However,
deposing Hussein, invading, and embarking on a state-building project requiring
massive investment in resources, was untenable.
But we invaded.
The
impetus behind the invasion was not, I believe, mischievous. There were, of
course, the mendacious tales of weapons of mass destruction. Whereas it seemes plausible that Hussein got
rid of the potentional ‘smoking gun’ before troops landed, semper necessitas probandi incumbit ei qui agit. After the invasion the United States managed
the acquisition of Iraq’s oil fields to China, Canada, the Netherlands, and
others, taking little for itself (a move that would have been justifiable,
perhaps, to contribute toward repaying war costs). But our motivation was patently
not to ‘build an empire’ and amass spoils, extending our reach like Imperial
Rome. To do so is not in our national character—and besides, we had reliable
lessons in history from mother Britain.
To my
mind, the mistake of the Bush administration lay in this myth: that pax americae can exist, not by Imperial
conquest, but by Imperial democracy-spreading.
The call
to leave Iraq was a reasonable one. After the passion of vengeance for 9-11
subsided with the invasion of Afghanistan and with the passing of time, our
heads cleared and we realized invading Iraq was not a wise decision. Losing
soldiers, loving peace, and with Monroe’s doctrine still in the back of our
minds, we wanted to be done with it.
So we left.
In my
opinion, an unwise decision compounded upon another. Leaving Prime Minister
Nuri Kamal al-Maliki to his sectarian impulses, and the Iraqi army
half-trained, we left a vacuum waiting to be filled.
At this
point, one can argue that, because we should have never invaded in the first
place, it didn’t matter what happened next: all that mattered was that we
leave.
But
that, it seems to me, is not a prudent conclusion to make. It seems to me that
after accepting the burden of Iraq, we should have carried it through.
But now what shall we do?
A
question above my pay grade, I will quote someone with a higher salary, more
experience, but goodness-knows if anything else. Here it is:
In Iraq,
the answer is not to send troops back in. It is to provide Maliki help in
exchange for concrete measures to reduce sectarian tensions. The Iraqi
government could empower regional governments, acknowledging the nation’s
diversity. Maliki could re-professionalize [sic] the Army. The Constitution
could impose term limits on prime ministers.
But
these provisions would require a more forward-leaning American posture around
the world, an awareness that sometimes a U.S.-created vacuum can be ruinous.
The president says his doctrine is don’t do stupid stuff. Sometimes withdrawal
is the stupidest thing of all.
Part of
the lesson we should learn from our mother, the mother of empire, is that in
our globalised world, a hegemonic ‘referee’ with the (albeit imperfect) values
of the United States is a relief; a gift to the world we should not be shy of
recognising. The full-scale invasion of Iraq was arguably a mistake, yes, but
that does not mean we should shuffle back to our shores in shame. To do so is
to leave—the Middle East in particular—in a precarious spot with hellish
radicals stealing the attention and resources of nation-states who should be
concentrating on providing security, stability, and freedom for their peoples.
The United States is just—and as of now the only—power who can provide
resistance to radicals’ movements, allowing nation-states in the Middle East
room to grow and breathe. The modes of our resistance are sundry; full-scale
‘boots on the ground’ invasions are not our only play.